Dynamic Coalitions and Communication: Private vs Public Negotiations

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Two Interesting Puzzles

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- Effects of experience diverging with different treatments.
 - → Evidence of communication *long-run* non-neutrality.

The Puzzle of Universal Allocations

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- Fairness or social image concerns. Do voters refuse advantageous offers that leave somebody out?
- Risk aversion: need extreme level to get universal, but might get allocation closer.
- Number of players. $n = 3 \Rightarrow$ highest absolute but lowest relative premium to MWC + cooperation in coalition easier.

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- Could have expected MWCs to increase in the long run also in the public treatment (learning, getting used to publis setup).
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- Evidence of communication being non-neutral.

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 - → Why so few conversations talking money?
- Incomplete info: role for learning types and/or how to play?

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- How to isolate the effect of the endogenous status quo?
- Potentially interesting to compare repeated play of static legislative bargaining with endogenous status quo bargaining.

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- That would make the equality puzzle even larger.

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- Here, public communication could be reproduced by triangulating messages with some key words, but harder.
- I'd be curious of outcomes under other variations of structure: e.g. one-way or face-to-face communication.

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- 14 findings could be condensed to less, especially if the list structure of the paper core is to be kept.
- Description of the findings could be coupled by more interpretation and perspective on the results.

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- Occurrence of universal allocations and mechanism governing the role of communication still to be fully understood.
- Plenty of stylized facts in search of explanations: fruitful avenues ahead for both theory and experiments!