

GIOVANNI ANDREOTTOLA

Contact Information

30 Hillhouse Avenue
06511 New Haven, CT, USA
+39 3285811627
Giovanni.Andreottola@yale.edu
www.giovanniandreottola.com

Personal Information: male, born 17th April 1987, Italian citizen

CURRENT POSITIONS

Postdoctoral Research Fellow *January 2018 - June 2019*
Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale

Postdoctoral Fellow, CSEF *July 2017 - present (on leave)*
Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Political Economy
Information Economics
Microeconomic Theory

EDUCATION

Ph.D. Economics *August 2012 - October 2017*
European University Institute, Florence
Supervisors: Andrea Mattozzi, David Levine
Defense Committee: Ronny Razin (LSE) and Alessandro Riboni (Polytechnique)

Visiting Ph.D. Student *August 2014 - December 2014*
New York University, Department of Economics

M.Res. Economics *August 2012- September 2013*
European University Institute, Florence
Department of Economics

M.Phil. Economics *September 2009 - June 2011*
University of Oxford
Wadham College

B.A. Economics *September 2006 - July 2009*
University of Trento

Visiting Student *July 2008 - January 2009*
University of Melbourne, Faculty of Business and Economics
International House College

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

ECON 415 – Political Economy (Undergraduate Course at Yale University) *Fall 2018*

Instructor of an advanced undergraduate course in Political Economy. The course covers social choice theory, voting theory, political agency models, models of pandering and reputation, behavioral political economy and models of democratization and conflict.

Microeconomics (Graduate Course at Napoli Federico II) *2017-2018*

Instructor for the first Microeconomics block in the LMEF, a graduate degree in Economics aimed at preparing students for a professional career or for a high quality doctorate. My course was mostly based on the Mas-Colell Winston and Green textbook and it covered consumer and producer theory, expected utility theory and some elements of general equilibrium theory.

Microeconomics (Ph.D. Course at EUI) *2014-2016*

Teaching assistant (for 3 academic years) of Professor Andrea Mattozzi for the compulsory PhD course in Microeconomics, covering Information Economics and Mechanism Design.

WORK EXPERIENCE

Morgan Stanley

Analyst

Investment Banking Division, Milan

July 2011 - August 2012

Deutsche Bank

Summer Intern

RREEF Infrastructure Fund, London

June 2010 - September 2010

AWARDS

IOEA 2017 Best Paper Award (for *Flip-flopping and Electoral Concerns*)

EUI Scholarship for Exchange Semester at NYU (2014)

Elected Student Representative for EUI Economics Department (2013)

Departmental Prize for Best Summer Paper (2013)

Best Class Performance in M.Res. Compulsory Exams, EUI (2013)

PhD completion grant, EUI (2015-2016)

Full PhD Scholarship for EUI, awarded by Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2012-2015)

Honour Loan by *Cassa Rurale di Trento* for Master Studies at the University of Oxford (2009)

University of Trento scholarship for exchange semester at University of Melbourne (2008)

Part of the B.A. Economics Excellence Track at University of Trento (2007-2009)

Selected for orientation week with *Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa* for outstanding students (2005)

RESEARCH PAPERS

Signalling Valence in Primary Elections – *R&R Games and Economic Behavior*

Abstract: I build a model in which a political party uses primary elections to select a candidate who will challenge an incumbent in a general election. Candidates differ in terms of privately-observed valence and they have to commit to a policy platform before the primary election. The main and novel result of the paper is to show that primaries enable valent candidates to separate from non-valent ones by choosing more partisan platforms. In other words, primary elections select better candidates at the cost of increased polarization. I also endogenize the choice of holding primaries and find that it can lead to asymmetric equilibria, in which only one political party holds primaries, an outcome which is

consistent for example with the cases of several social-democratic parties in Europe.

Flip-flopping and Electoral Concerns

Abstract: Politicians who change their mind on a policy issue are often confronted with the accusation of being flip-floppers. However, a changing environment sometimes makes policy revisions necessary. The present analysis suggests that flip-flopping signals that politicians are poorly informed and is therefore detrimental to their reputation. As a result, electorally concerned politicians can have an incentive to keep their initial policy choice unchanged, despite it being inefficient, in order to avoid the stigma of flip-flopping. This distorted behaviour is not only damaging in terms of policy welfare, but also in terms of a worse selection of competent politicians through elections. Variations of the baseline model are used to provide an in-depth discussion of several possible ways to address the unwillingness of politicians to respond to information: these include term limits, the presence of media and the partial delegation of actions to independent agents.

Scandals, Media Competition and Political Accountability – *with Antoni-Italo De Moragas*

Abstract: We present a model of a media market in which a set of news outlets compete to break a news. In our model, each media receives some information on whether the politician in office is corrupt. Media outlets can decide whether to break the story immediately or wait and fact-check, taking into account that if another media breaks the news, the profit opportunity disappears. We show that as the number of competitors increases, each outlet becomes more likely to break the news without fact-checking. Therefore, as the number of media increases, the incumbent politician is more likely to be accused of corruption by the media: this makes the re-election of incumbents more difficult and increases political turnover. In particular, we show that if voters consult the media outlets that report about a scandal at a higher frequency, increasing the number of competitors decreases the probability of having an honest politician in office.

PRESENTATIONS

April 2019: MPSA, Chicago (scheduled).

June 2018: SIOE Conference Montréal: “Flip-flopping and Electoral Concerns”.

June 2018: Rotterdam PE Workshop: “Scandals, Media Competition and Political Accountability”.

March 2018: EUI, Microeconomics Working Group: “Policy Experimentation under Disagreement”.

January 2018: Yale, Leitner Seminar: “Flip-flopping and Electoral Concerns”.

October 2017: CSEF Lunch Seminar: “Scandals, Media Competition and Political Accountability”.

June 2017: NICEP Conference, Nottingham: “Flip-flopping and Electoral Concerns”.

May 2017: IOEA session, Cargèse (Corsica): presenter and discussant.

January 2017: Naples Federico II, : “Flip-flopping and Electoral Concerns”.

January 2017: University of Bologna: : “Flip-flopping and Electoral Concerns”.

December 2016: Max Planck Institute, Munich:: “Flip-flopping and Electoral Concerns”.

November 2016: EUI Microeconomics Working Group: “Flip-flopping and Electoral Concerns”.

November 2016: Workshop on Economic Policy Challenges, EUI. Discussant of *Globalization and Political Structure*, by Gino Gancia, Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto and Jaume Ventura.

August 2016: EEA-ESEM Conference, Geneva. Presented *Signalling Valence in Primary Elections*.

July 2016: Petralia Sottana (Sicily), Job Market Bootcamp: “Flip-flopping and Electoral Concerns”.

July 2016: Summer Political Economy Workshop, EIEF. Discussant of *Dynamic Coalitions and Com-*

munication: Private vs Public Negotiations, by David P. Baron, Renee Bowen and Salvatore Nunnari.
November 2015: Workshop on Economic Policy and Financial Frictions, EUI. Discussant of *Efficiency of Flexible Budgetary Institutions*, by R. Bowen, Y. Chen, H. Eraslan, J. Zapal.

REFEREEING

Journal of Public Economics; The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization; Journal of Public Economic Theory; Economic Policy; Public Choice.

OTHER SKILLS

Languages: Italian (Native), English (Fluent), German (Good), French (Good), Spanish (Basic)

Computing: L^AT_EX, Mathematica, Stata, Matlab, Microsoft Office, Mac OS X

Sports: Alpine Skiing, Swimming, Biking, Climbing, Running

REFERENCES

Andrea Mattozzi

European University Institute
Department of Economics
Via delle Fontanelle 18
50014 Fiesole, Italy
Andrea.Mattozzi@eui.eu

Larry Samuelson

Yale University
Department of Economics
30 Hillhouse Avenue, 06511 New Haven
Larry.Samuelson@yale.edu

David Levine

European University Institute
Department of Economics
Via delle Fontanelle 18
50014 Fiesole, Italy
David.Levine@eui.eu

Alessandro Riboni

École Polytechnique
Département d'Économie
91128 Palaiseau CEDEX, France
Alessandro.Riboni@polytechnique.edu