

GIOVANNI ANDREOTTOLA

CONTACT INFORMATION

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ACADEMIC POSITIONS

Postdoctoral Fellow, CSEF
Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II

September 2019 - present
July - December 2017

Postdoctoral Research Fellow
Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics
Yale University

January 2018 - June 2019

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Political Economy, Information Economics, Microeconomic Theory

EDUCATION

Ph.D. Economics
European University Institute, Florence
Supervisors: Andrea Mattozzi, David Levine
Committee: Ronny Razin, Alessandro Riboni

August 2012 - October 2017

Visiting Ph.D. Student
New York University, Department of Economics
Host: Alessandro Lizzeri

August 2014 - December 2014

M.Res. Economics
European University Institute, Florence
Department of Economics

August 2012 - September 2013

M.Phil. Economics
University of Oxford
Wadham College

September 2009 - June 2011

B.A. Economics
University of Trento

September 2006 - July 2009

Visiting Student
University of Melbourne, Faculty of Business and Economics

July 2008 - January 2009

RESEARCH PAPERS

Flip-flopping and Electoral Concerns – *Tentatively Accepted, [*The Journal of Politics*](#)*

I consider a model of political agency in which an incumbent politician takes two decisions in sequence, having private information about the correct decision in each period. I find that policy reversals signal that a politician is incompetent. This suggests that the stigma associated with flip-flopping can be rationalized as a simple heuristic to select competent politicians. Furthermore, the negative impact of policy reversals on reputation gives the incumbent politician an incentive to disregard new information and stick to his initial policy. When reputation concerns are sufficiently strong, these incentives inhibit

policy responsiveness, resulting in an inefficient degree of policy persistence. Term-limited politicians, or politicians with particularly safe (or compromised) election prospects, are more likely to reverse decisions. Relatedly, politicians are only willing to reverse decisions after a sufficient amount of time has passed, or when there is sufficient evidence that the state of the world might have changed.

Signalling Valence in Primary Elections – *Accepted, Games and Economic Behavior*

This paper presents a model of two-stage (primary and general) elections in which primary election candidates differ in terms of a privately observed quality dimension (valence). I show that primary election candidates have the incentive to signal their valence by means of their policy platform choice. There can be two types of separating equilibria in primary elections, with opposite implications concerning the relationship between valence and policy extremism. In an *extremist* equilibrium valent candidates choose more extreme policies than non-valent ones, whereas in a *centrist* equilibrium valent candidates move close to the incumbent from the opposing party. As a result, primary elections can foster the adoption of extremist policies, but they can also have the opposite effect. This result allows the model to also shed light on the circumstances in which party voters are likely to benefit from the introduction of primary elections.

Polarization and Policy Design – *with Christopher M. Li*

Political polarization has been on the rise in various democracies. One major concern is whether this leads to more divisive policies. The paper addresses this issue in a dynamic model of policy design. We show that increasing electoral polarization may in fact motivate politicians to design policies with less partisan bias. More generally, partisan discrimination is non-monotonic in the level of mass polarization. The prospect of political turnover and the gradual resolution of uncertainty over the effects of the policy are key for the result. We also consider the impact of different electoral systems. Counter to conventional wisdom, a proportional system may lead to more particularistic policymaking than a majoritarian system.

Scandals, Media Competition and Political Accountability – *with Antoni-Italo De Moragas*

We present a model of a media market in which a set of news outlets compete to break news. In our model, each media receives some information on whether a politician in office is corrupt. Media outlets can decide whether to break the story immediately or wait and fact-check, taking into account that if another media breaks the news, the profit opportunity disappears. We show that as the number of competitors increases, each outlet becomes more likely to publish unverified news. As a result, we uncover a non-monotonicity in the relationship between competition and social welfare: increasing the number of competitors initially improves accountability, but there is a critical number of competitors after which competition decreases welfare, because of the worsening of publishing standards.

WORK IN PROGRESS

Strategic Extremism and Voters' Sophistication – *with Elia Sartori*

News Filtering on Social Media – *with Anna D'Annunzio and Giovanni Immordino*

Experts and Political Accountability – *with Antoni-Italo De Moragas and Philipp Denter*

Interrogation Methods – *with Federico Vaccari*

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Microeconomics – Graduate Course in English at Napoli Federico II *Fall 2017, 2019 and 2020*
ECON 415 – Political Economy – Undergraduate Course at Yale *Fall 2018*
Microeconomics – Ph.D. Course at EUI (Teaching Assistant) *Winter 2014, 2015 and 2016*

WORK EXPERIENCE

Morgan Stanley – Analyst, Investment Banking Division *July 2011 - August 2012*
Deutsche Bank – Summer Intern, RREEF Infrastructure *June 2010 - September 2010*

AWARDS

IOEA 2017 Best Paper Award; PhD completion grant, EUI (2015-2016); EUI Scholarship for Exchange Semester at NYU (2014); Elected Student Representative for EUI Economics Department (2013); Departmental Prize for Best Summer Paper (2013); Best Class Performance in M.Res. Compulsory Exams, EUI (2013); Full PhD Scholarship for EUI, awarded by Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2012-2015); Honour Loan by *Cassa Rurale di Trento* for Master Studies at the University of Oxford (2009); University of Trento scholarship for exchange semester at University of Melbourne (2008); Part of the B.A. Economics Excellence Track at University of Trento (2007-2009)

PRESENTATIONS

Virtual Formal Theory Seminar 2020 (x 2); OPESS 2020 (coauthor); EUI Micro Working Group 2020; CSEF Lunch Seminar 2020; Princeton Political Economy Seminar 2020 (coauthor); ASSET 2019, Athens; SAET 2019, Ischia; Yale Theory Breakfast; MPSA 2019, Chicago; SIOE 2018, Montreal; Rotterdam PE Workshop 2018; EUI Micro Working Group 2018; Yale Leitner Seminar 2018; CSEF Lunch Seminar 2017; NICEP Conference 2017; IOEA Cargese 2017; University of Naples Federico II (job talk) 2017; University of Bologna (job talk) 2017; Max Planck Munich (job talk) 2016; EUI Micro Working Group 2016; EEA-ESEM 2016; Petralia Workshop 2016.

REFEREEING

Journal of Public Economics; The Journal of Politics; The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization; European Economic Review; Journal of Public Economic Theory; Public Choice; Economic Policy.

OTHER SKILLS

Languages: Italian (Native), English (Fluent), German (Very Good), French (Fair), Spanish (Basic)
Computing: L^AT_EX, Mathematica, Stata, Matlab
Sports: Alpine Skiing, Hiking, Biking, Swimming

REFERENCES

Andrea Mattozzi
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European University Institute
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