

GIOVANNI ANDREOTTOLA

Contact Information

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Personal Information: male, born 17th April 1987, Italian citizen

CURRENT POSITIONS

Postdoctoral Research Fellow *January 2018 - December 2018*
Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale

Postdoctoral Fellow, CSEF *July 2017 - present (on leave)*
Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Political Economy
Information Economics
Game Theory

EDUCATION

Ph.D. Economics *August 2012 - October 2017*
European University Institute, Florence
Supervisors: Andrea Mattozzi, David Levine
Defense Committee: Ronny Razin (LSE) and Alessandro Riboni (Polytechnique)

M.Res. Economics *August 2012- September 2013*
European University Institute, Florence
Department of Economics

M.Phil. Economics *September 2009 - June 2011*
University of Oxford
Wadham College

B.A. Economics *September 2006 - July 2009*
University of Trento

Scientific Maturità *September 2001 - July 2006*
Liceo Scientifico G.Galilei, Trento

VISITING POSITIONS

New York University *August 2014 - December 2014*
Department of Economics

University of Melbourne *July 2008 - January 2009*
Faculty of Business and Economics
International House College

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Microeconomics (M.Sc. Course at Napoli Federico II) 2017-2018
Instructor for the first Microeconomics block in the LMEF, an English language Master Degree in Economics aimed at preparing students for a professional career or for a high quality doctorate. My course covered consumer and production theory, expected utility theory and some elements of general equilibrium theory.

Microeconomics (Ph.D. Course at EUI) 2014-2016
Teaching assistant (for 3 academic years) of Professor Andrea Mattozzi for the compulsory PhD course in Microeconomics, covering Information Economics and Mechanism Design.

WORK EXPERIENCE

Morgan Stanley July 2011 - August 2012
Analyst
Investment Banking Division, Milan

Deutsche Bank June 2010 - September 2010
Summer Intern
RREEF Infrastructure Fund, London

AWARDS

IOEA 2017 Best Paper Award (for *Flip-flopping and Electoral Concerns*)

EUI Scholarship for Exchange Semester at NYU (2014)

Elected Student Representative for EUI Economics Department (2013)

Departmental Prize for Best Summer Paper (2013)

Best Class Performance in M.Res. Compulsory Exams, EUI (2013)

Full PhD Scholarship for EUI, awarded by Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2012-2016)

Honour Loan by *Cassa Rurale di Trento* for Master Studies at the University of Oxford (2009)

University of Trento scholarship for exchange semester at University of Melbourne (2008)

Part of the B.A. Economics Excellence Track at University of Trento (2007-2009)

Selected for orientation week with *Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa* for outstanding students (2005)

RESEARCH PAPERS

Flip-flopping and Electoral Concerns (Job Market Paper)

Abstract: Politicians who change their mind on a policy issue are often confronted with the accusation of being flip-floppers. However, a changing environment makes policy revisions sometimes necessary. The present analysis suggests that flip-flopping on a policy issue is detrimental to a politician's reputation because it sends a bad signal on the accuracy of his information. As a result, electorally concerned politicians can have the incentive to stick to a no longer efficient policy choice in order to avoid the stigma of flip-flopping. This distorted behaviour is not only damaging in terms of policy welfare, but also in terms of a worse selection of competent politicians through elections. In this context, a single-term limit rule can improve welfare, despite achieving undistorted policies to the detriment of selection. At the same time, introducing some noise in voters' observation of the policy choice is always optimal, whereas providing voters with a signal about the state of the world can lead to increased distortions. These results lend themselves to an interesting interpretation in terms of ability of the media to discipline politicians.

Scandals, Media Competition and Political Accountability

Abstract: We present a model of a media market in which a set of news outlets compete to break a news. In our model, each media receives some information on whether a politician in office is corrupt. Media outlets can decide whether to break the story immediately or wait and fact-check, taking into account that if another media breaks the news, the profit opportunity disappears. We show that as the number of competitors increases, each outlet becomes more likely to break the news without fact-checking. Therefore, as the number of media increases, the incumbent politician is more likely to be accused of corruption by the media: this makes the re-election of incumbents more difficult and increases political turnover. In particular, we show that if voters consult with higher priority the media outlets that report about a scandal, increasing the number of competitors decreases the probability of having an honest politician in office.

Signalling Valence in Primary Elections

Abstract: I build a model in which a political party uses primary elections to select a candidate who will challenge an incumbent in a general election. Candidates differ in terms of a privately-observed valence and they have to commit to a policy platform before the primary election. The main and novel result of the paper is to show that primaries enable valent candidates to separate from non-valent ones by choosing more partisan platforms. In other words, primary elections select better candidates at the cost of increased polarization. I also endogenize the choice of holding primaries and find that it can lead to asymmetric equilibria, in which only one political party holds primaries, an outcome which is consistent for example with the cases of several social-democratic parties in Europe.

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

October 2017: CSEF Lunch Seminar: “Scandals, Media Competition and Political Accountability”.

June 2017: NICEP Conference, Nottingham: presentation of Job Market Paper.

May 2017: IOEA session, Cargèse (Corsica): presenter and discussant.

November 2016: EUI Microeconomics Working Group. Job Market Paper presentation.

November 2016: Workshop on Economic Policy Challenges, EUI. Discussant of *Globalization and Political Structure*, by Gino Gancia, Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto and Jaume Ventura.

August 2016: EEA-ESEM Conference, Geneva. Presented *Signalling Valence in Primary Elections*.

July 2016: Petralia Sottana (Sicily), Job Market Bootcamp. Presented my Job Market Paper.

July 2016: Summer Political Economy Workshop, EIEF. Discussant of *Dynamic Coalitions and Communication: Private vs Public Negotiations*, by David P. Baron, Renee Bowen and Salvatore Nunnari.

November 2015: Workshop on Economic Policy and Financial Frictions, EUI. Discussant of *Efficiency of Flexible Budgetary Institutions*, by R. Bowen, Y. Chen, H. Eraslan, J. Zapal.

REFEREEING

Economic Policy; The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.

OTHER SKILLS

Languages: Italian (Native), English (Fluent), German (Good), French (Good), Spanish (Basic)

Computing: L^AT_EX, Mathematica, Stata, Matlab, Microsoft Office, Mac OS X

Sports: Alpine Skiing, Swimming, Biking, Climbing

REFERENCES

Andrea Mattozzi

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Department of Economics

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David Levine

European University Institute

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Alessandro Riboni

École Polytechnique

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