

# GIOVANNI ANDREOTTOLA

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## CURRENT POSITION

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**PhD Candidate, Department of Economics**

*August 2012 - Present*

European University Institute, Florence

Supervisors: Andrea Mattozzi, David Levine

## RESEARCH INTERESTS

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Political Economy

Information Economics

Game Theory

## EDUCATION

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**M.Res. Economics**

*August 2012- September 2013*

European University Institute, Florence

Department of Economics

**M.Phil. Economics**

*September 2009 - June 2011*

University of Oxford

Wadham College

**B.A. Economics**

*September 2006 - July 2009*

University of Trento

**Scientific Maturità**

*September 2001 - July 2006*

Liceo Scientifico G.Galilei, Trento

## VISITING POSITIONS

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**New York University**

*August 2014 - December 2014*

Department of Economics

**University of Melbourne**

*July 2008 - January 2009*

Faculty of Business and Economics

International House College

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

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**Microeconomics (Ph.D. Course at EUI)**

*2014-2016*

Assistant of Professor Andrea Mattozzi for the compulsory PhD course in Microeconomics, covering Information Economics and Mechanism Design.

## WORK EXPERIENCE

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**Morgan Stanley**

*July 2011 - August 2012*

Analyst

Investment Banking Division, Milan

**Deutsche Bank**

*June 2010 - September 2010*

Summer Intern

RREEF Infrastructure Fund, London

## AWARDS

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EUI Scholarship for Exchange Semester at NYU (2014)  
Elected Student Representative for EUI Economics Department (2013)  
Departmental Prize for Best Summer Paper (2013)  
Best Class Performance in M.Res Compulsory Exams, EUI (2013)  
Full PhD Scholarship for EUI, awarded by Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2012-2016)  
Honour Loan by *Cassa Rurale di Trento* for Master Studies at the University of Oxford (2009)  
University of Trento scholarship for exchange semester at University of Melbourne (2008)  
Part of the B.A. Economics Excellence Track at University of Trento (2007-2009)  
Selected for orientation week with *Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa* for outstanding students (2005)

## RESEARCH PAPERS

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### **Flip-flopping and Electoral Concerns** (Job Market Paper)

**Abstract:** Politicians who change their mind on a policy issue are often confronted with the accusation of being flip-floppers. However, a changing environment makes policy revisions sometimes necessary. How can we explain the bad reputation from flip-flopping, then? The present analysis suggests that flip-flopping on a policy issue is detrimental to a politician's reputation because it sends a bad signal on the accuracy of his information. As a result, electorally concerned politicians can have the incentive to stick to a no longer efficient policy choice in order to avoid the stigma of flip-flopping. This distorted behaviour is not only damaging in terms of policy welfare, but also in terms of a worse selection of competent politicians through elections. A single-term limit rule can be welfare improving by disciplining politicians to act in accordance with their information. At the same time, introducing some noise in voters' observation of the politician's action is always optimal, whereas making voters more informed on what is the right policy can lead to increased distortions.

### **Signalling Valence in Primary Elections**

**Abstract:** I build a model in which primary elections are used by a political party to select a candidate to challenge an incumbent in a general election. Candidates differ in terms of a privately-observed valence and they have to commit to a policy platform before the primary election. The main and novel result of the paper is to show that primaries enable valent candidates to separate from non-valent ones by choosing more partisan platforms. In other words, primary elections select better candidates at the cost of increased polarization. I also endogenize the choice of holding primaries and find that it can lead to asymmetric equilibria, in which only one political party holds primaries, an outcome which is consistent for example with the cases of several social-democratic parties in Europe.

## CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

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November 2016: EUI Microeconomics Working Group. Job Market Paper presentation.  
November 2016: Workshop on Economic Policy Challenges, EUI. Discussant of *Globalization and Political Structure*, by Gino Gancia, Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto and Jaume Ventura.  
August 2016: EEA-ESEM Conference, Geneva. Presented *Signalling Valence in Primary Elections*.  
July 2016: Petralia Sottana (Sicily), Job Market Bootcamp. Presented my Job Market Paper.  
July 2016: Summer Political Economy Workshop, EIEF. Discussant of *Dynamic Coalitions and Communication: Private vs Public Negotiations*, by David P. Baron, Renee Bowen and Salvatore Nunnari.

November 2015: Workshop on Economic Policy and Financial Frictions, EUI. Discussant of *Efficiency of Flexible Budgetary Institutions*, by R. Bowen, Y. Chen, H. Eraslan, J. Zapal.

## REFEREEING

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Economic Policy

## OTHER SKILLS

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**Languages:** Italian (Native), English (Fluent), German (Intermediate-Advanced), French (Intermediate), Spanish (Mostly Oral Understanding)

**Computing:** L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X, Mathematica, Stata, Matlab, Microsoft Office, Mac OS X

**Sports:** Alpine Skiing, Swimming, Biking, Climbing

## REFERENCES

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### **Andrea Mattozzi**

European University Institute

Department of Economics

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### **David Levine**

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